Virtuous Motives?
I’m currently working on a book about the virtue of humility, and have been reading through parts of a great philosophical book by Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues. They define virtues as traits that make one an excellent person. I like this definition, as it focuses not just on capacities or abilities of persons, but persons themselves.
There is an interesting discussion in chapter 3 about motive and virtue. Specifically, in a discussion of humility, Roberts and Wood state that
Humility presupposes an overriding interest in something…Christ’s humility is shown by his willingness to forfeit or set aside his divine standing (Phil. 2:6-8). It presupposes his charity towards sinners, which is what motivates him to undertake the task in which he exhibits his humility. But it seems to make sense that he is motivated, not by his humility, but by his charity (pp. 77-78).
This got me to thinking about the connections between virtue and motivation more generally. I don’t know if this is a proper motivation, but I think that sometimes I’m motivated to act in a particular way because I want to have or express the relevant virtue. For example, I am at times motivated to act patiently because I want to be patient. But I wonder if the motives for being courageous, humble, patient, or zealous should never ultimately be the virtue itself, but the good at which it ultimately aims?
What do you think?
I think we need to look at Jesus motivations for doing things, or just why he did things in a certain way at all. Of course, he did have reasons for doing things, and they were the most intelligent reasons possible. Because of what he KNEW, and WHO he was, he acted the way he did. Virtues were a natural fruit of his heart and his heart was infinitely wise and good. we can put on a heart like Jesus through Gods work within us, and spiritual disciplines, transforming the heart, the contents of the mind and habits of body and brain.
I don’t think it’s anywhere near wrong to act virtuous for the sake of obtaining the character quality, but ultimately we pursue character; that’s often how we realize our limitations in becoming good though. Which is why disciplines must be done that would enable us indirectly to become a certain kind of person who naturally acts in a certain virtuous way.
Especially in the case of humility, I wonder if such episodes of abstract self-reflection may not be symptoms of one’s having fallen away from more fully embodying virtue, in analogy with breakdowns in “flow” experiences during activities in which such absorption tracks optimal performance and explicit reflection is a liability. This would be more of a Nietzschean, “moraline-free” sense of virtue in which the quality of its realization might be valued in terms of how little philosophizing and explicit self-reflection intrudes.